Global Research,
Region: Europe, Russia and FSU
Europe is experiencing the most dangerous security crisis of the post-Cold War period. The real problem is not the possibility of war, but the erosion of the crisis management capacity of the parties.
The Ukraine war is no longer just a regional conflict on the Ukrainian ground. The tension between NATO and Russia on the line stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from Poland to Kaliningrad has entered a new strategic stage. The Russia-Ukraine war has entered a very dangerous escalation phase again in recent days. The high-intensity missile and UAV attacks carried out by Russia against Ukraine, especially in the last ten days, show that the war has entered a new phase not only on the front line but also in strategic depth. Intense attacks on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro and energy infrastructure began to strain Ukraine’s air defense capacity.
In the same process, while Russia increased the pressure to advance on the front line, especially on the Donbas axis, signs of growing manpower and ammunition losses on the Ukrainian side are noteworthy. It is no coincidence that even in the Western media, there is an increase in analyzes that Ukraine is now experiencing strategic defense fatigue. While writing these lines, Russia’s advice to NATO states to evacuate Kiev should be taken into account. Putin and the Russian state seem not to allow Ukraine to become a new Afghanistan – that is, a battlefield of attrition. At the same time, it was claimed that Russia attacked an apartment building in Romania with a UAV.
Putin, on the other hand, implied that it was a false flag operation and blamed the western media. (If we look at the recent false flag operation record of the USA and the UK and remember the confession that CENTCOM Admiral Cooper reverse-engineered and used Iranian Shaheed SİHAs in the Iran-Israel-US war, we can say that the same can be done for Russia.)
In parallel with these developments, Europe is experiencing the most dangerous security crisis of the post-Cold War period. However, the real problem is not the increase in the possibility of war, but the erosion of the crisis management capacity of the parties. Just as Europe was dragged into great wars in an environment of alliance systems, arms race, media propaganda and mutual distrust before 1914 and 1939, a similar psychological and strategic climate is emerging today. However, today’s difference is that the process takes place in the nuclear age, in the environment of UAVs, hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence-supported war technologies. The risk of miscalculation has now reached an existential level for humanity. In particular, the Black Sea airspace and the Suwalki Corridor, which provides the only transportation opportunity under NATO control that controls Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast neighboring Lithuania, the Belarusian border neighboring Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, and the Baltic airspace have become among the most dangerous contact areas in the world today.
Europe’s Declining Capacity and Increased Provocation Capability
Despite these experiences, the contradiction between the economic picture in Europe and the language of war is great. Europe today does not have the production infrastructure, ammunition stockpiles and social resilience to sustain a major war. Despite this, its capacity to produce crises and encourage escalation is increasing. While European economies are under serious pressure from deindustrialization, rising energy costs, loss of production, public debts and demographic collapse, it is thought-provoking that Atlanticist circles are turning to an increasingly aggressive line against Russia and see rearmament as a solution. In particular, Mersz, Macron, Starmer and the Baltic security circles are shifting towards an increasingly aggressive line against Russia despite the peoples they represent, and they are dragging Europe into an increasingly high-risk strategic line.
However, there is a serious disconnect between Europe’s real military capacity and its political discourse. For this reason, the most powerful element that Europe has today is not military power, but the capacity to produce provocative strategic behavior. This is where the greatest danger arises. Because actors whose capacity weakens often start to act more riskily. In this case, they look for states that will shed their blood for them.
Russia Shifts Paradigm
In this atmosphere, one of the most important strategic messages given by Moscow came through the Oreshnik missile. The message sent by Russia in its Oreshnik attack on Kiev last week is directed at NATO, not just Ukraine. The Kremlin openly declares that the war will not be limited to the Ukrainian field, but that it can activate a new generation of high-precision systems that can reach deep into Europe if necessary.
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An Oreshnik missile / Photo: United 24
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The Oreshnik message is a message of psychological deterrence beyond the classic missile show. Here, Moscow is giving the message to Poland, the Baltic line and Germany, that if Ukraine continues its drone attacks into Russia with their help, then NATO will become a de facto party to the war and Europe will no longer be safe. When these developments are combined with the escalation on the Baltic-Belarus-Poland line, an extremely dangerous picture emerges. The nuclear exercises with Russia in Belarus, the military buildup around Kaliningrad, the anti-Russian drone attacks and sabotage allegations that came to the fore through Latvia, and the nuclear deterrence rhetoric of Poland and France, are carrying Europe to the riskiest period after the Cold War.
In particular, the fact that Kaliningrad has become a direct target in NATO planning is seen as an existential threat for Moscow. Because Kaliningrad is not only a military base, but also a strategic gate to Russia’s Baltic access. The process in Europe today has gone far beyond the classical defense reflex. The emerging picture is turning into a multi-layered geopolitical struggle in which controlled crisis production, hybrid warfare, economic attrition, energy competition, psychological warfare and nuclear deterrence are used simultaneously. Europe today sees Russia through the same glasses that Britain saw Germany in 1914. Encircling a state with the world’s largest nuclear capacity, huge energy resources, critical mineral reserves and Eurasian depth and forcing it to go to war with NATO will have not only regional but also global consequences.
Moscow, on the other hand, sees Europe’s increasing hostility and intention. It moves away from the limited operation option (SMO) of the beginning. In the first period, Russia was carrying out a controlled pressure strategy that would force Ukraine to reach a neutrality agreement. However, recent messages from the Kremlin show that this has changed. The fact that Russian diplomats openly bring up European targets, indirectly target NATO elements in Kyiv, and give a message by publishing the names of factories and institutions producing weapons and sensors for Ukraine in NATO countries is a sign of a new paradigm. Moscow is now showing that the war may not remain only in Ukraine. Europe is hardening politically, but not all members of NATO are ready to go to all-out war with Russia.
For this reason, Moscow has announced that limited but high impact strikes against selected NATO targets will automatically lead to NATO’s 5th Amendment. It thinks that it will not operate the article. This thesis is becoming increasingly visible in the Russian strategic mind. Because, according to Moscow, in the event of a limited crisis centered on the Baltic countries or Poland;Turkiye, Germany, Italy, Slovakia and even some Western European states may be reluctant to enter the war directly. In particular, the issue of whether Washington will risk nuclear war for Europe is now being discussed even in Europe.
Cracks Within NATO Deepen
While the global system is increasingly divided into tougher blocs, the American-centered unipolar structure established under the discourse of rules-based international order after the Cold War has now lost its sustainability. However, the Atlantic system, which does not want to lose its hegemony and colonial tradition, makes its containment strategies more aggressive instead of retreating. NATO’s strategy of wearing down Russia through Ukraine is no longer just about defending Ukraine. This process aims to erode Russia’s strategic depth, to put it under pressure on the line stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and to break the Eurasian-centered alternative power architecture. On the other hand, Moscow is going beyond classical conventional deterrence and making the nuclear threshold card more visible. Russian strategists such as Karaganov argue that tactical nuclear weapons should be used against Europe if necessary, and that this will reduce European hostility by providing high deterrence.
This situation makes diplomacy dysfunctional. In such a psychology, the negotiating table ceases to be a real solution ground, it only turns into a means of buying time. For NATO, Russia’s refusal to back down is seen as revisionist aggression, while for Moscow, NATO’s enlargement strategy is read as a direct existential threat. This perception of mutual threat takes the classic security dilemma to a much more dangerous level. At the point reached today, alliance systems destroy the strategic flexibility of states. This process leads states to reactionary security behaviors instead of rational calculations. Most of the great wars in history were born in this very environment.
Today, NATO is not as homogeneous as it seems from the outside. While the Baltic states, Poland and the UK advocate the more aggressive line, many European countries are wary of the economic and social costs. The gradual shift of the US’s priority to China and West Asia also increases the uncertainty in Europe. Washington no longer seems to intend to move the Ukrainian file with unlimited resources. This makes Europe more aggressive, but also more fragile. Moscow therefore considers NATO’s political integrity to be more fragile than its military capacity. The Russian strategic approach is no longer based only on military attrition, but also on producing political disintegration within NATO.
The New Era of Deterrence and Europe’s Blindness
The crisis experienced today is not a classical war preparation in which the parties set rational goals and manage them in a controlled manner. The main danger is the wear of the control mechanisms. For this reason, the current process is not so much a planned total war, but a phase of uncontrolled drift with a growing risk of chain escalation. Russia’s hypersonic capacity, vast ammunition production infrastructure, energy resources and Eurasian depth have changed the war model that Europe is accustomed to. The Oreshnik message is not only a technical but also a psychological threshold. Moscow is now giving the message that it is ready for war with Europe. The most critical aspect of hypersonic systems is that they dramatically shorten decision times. Crisis scenarios, which leaders could evaluate within hours during the Cold War, have decreased to minutes or even seconds today. This is where the real danger begins.
Europe, on the other hand, still acts with the unipolar psychology of the 1990s. This is the real strategic blindness. Because the power it faces today is neither Saddam’s Iraq nor Yugoslavia. It faces a Eurasian power with the world’s largest nuclear capability, huge energy reserves and Chinese support. Russia is now clearly showing that it does not believe in the unlimited deterrence capacity of the United States after the defeat in Iran and of NATO after the events in Ukraine for the last 4.5 years. For this reason, the psychology of war becomes more dangerous. Because the parties act assuming that each other will take a step back. Under these conditions the Baltic-Belarus-Poland line has become one of the most risky contact areas in Europe today. This region is no longer a classical military build-up area, but a geopolitical fracture line where the psychology of the nuclear threshold is directly felt. Kaliningrad Oblast is critical in this respect. Because this is not just a military base. It is the key to Russia’s access to the Baltic. It is also the main pressure area for NATO. The Suwalki Corridor is the most fragile physical contact point between NATO and Russia. A small military contact here could trigger a chain escalation mechanism.
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KALININGRAD REGION, RUSSIA, MARCH 11, 2019: S-400 Triumf anti-aircraft missile system crews have assumed combat duty in the Kaliningrad Region, the system designed to repel any contemporary aerospace attack, such as stealth and fighter aircraft, bombers, cruise and ballistic missiles, drones and hypersonic targets. Vitaly
In July 2025, General Christopher Donahue, Commander of the US Army Europe and Africa, stated that Kaliningrad has now become a region surrounded by NATO countries and that the alliance can neutralize this region in a shorter time than ever before. Donahue’s statement that you can control the sea from land was interpreted by Russia not only as a military assessment, but also as an open declaration of blockade and actual intervention scenarios against Kaliningrad. Such a discourse about Kaliningrad, one of the important elements of Moscow’s nuclear deterrent, was recorded as a sign of a dangerous escalation in NATO-Russia tensions.
Therefore, the intensity of nuclear exercises on the border of Belarus, Lithuania is extremely risky. Because the line between deterrence and attack preparation is becoming increasingly blurred. In this context, the atmosphere of continuous nuclear war created on the European public opinion also puts great pressure on decision-makers. Such environments increase the risk of error. As a result,the world today is going through not only regional wars but also a global system crisis. While the American-centered unipolar order is dissolving through the Pacific, West Asia, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, the new balance of power is being established through a bloody transition process. It was precisely these transitional phases that were the most dangerous periods in history. In this environment, the biggest threat is the system’s own automatic crisis production mechanism rather than irrational leaders. The risk of miscalculation is therefore the greatest danger facing humanity.
Türkiye’s Strategic Impasse
The world is going through a new period of power transition. While the Atlantic-centered order is eroding, new Eurasian-centered power centers are rising. As Europe loses its economic capacity, it is moving towards a tougher line in its security discourse. This picture places Türkiye, which is the key to the Black Sea, at the center of geopolitical turbulence. When the developments before the NATO Summit to be held in Türkiye on July 7-8, 2026, are evaluated together, it is seen that a multi-front pressure strategy extending from the Aegean to the Black Sea is being implemented against Ankara. Although Türkiye is a NATO member on paper, it confronts some actors within NATO on many issues in the field.
In this context, the EFES-2026 Joint Exercise held in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean was not only a training activity, but also a comprehensive show of power in which Türkiye demonstrated its will to deter risks and threats in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean with its military capacity and defense industry power. The Blue Homeland Law initiative and the statements of the Ministry of National Defense completed this message. However, it was during this period that Greece increased its military rapprochement with Israel, announced new armament programs and intensified provocative activities around Meis drew attention.
Energy competition in the Eastern Mediterranean is also part of the same pressure picture. Chevron’s acquisition of new license areas without considering the Libyan continental shelf and the rights of the TRNC shows that the energy struggle in the region is accelerating. While the Eastern Mediterranean resources have become more critical for the West due to the crises around Hormuz and energy supply security concerns, the main geopolitical variable in this equation continues to be Türkiye.
The developments in the Black Sea should be evaluated within the same framework. The attacks on merchant ships with unmanned sea vehicles bearing Ukrainian signs off the coast of Kilyos (off Istanbul Blacksea Coast) cannot be seen as a message only to Russia. Through this attack the maritime security in Türkiye’s jurisdiction and responsibility is targeted. Considering the attack on the Altura tanker in March 2026, concerns that the war in the Black Sea is intended to move towards the Turkish coast are increased. One of the aims is to pull Ankara towards a tougher NATO line and weaken the balance policy. (While there was no condemnation or explanation for the attacks in Kilyos by our media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense, it is noteworthy that the condemnation messages against the Turkish ship allegedly hit by a Russian UAV in Odesa came at a great speed.)
Today, Türkiye is facing simultaneous pressures in the Aegean through the axis of Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel, and in the Black Sea through the Ukraine war and hawkish circles within NATO. For this reason, it is necessary to look at the events not individually, but as parts of the same strategic picture. In addition, there is a risk of reactivating ethnic, sectarian and identity-based fault lines that may weaken Türkiye’s national unity and solidarity. The internal crises and fragmentation tendencies of the main opposition party should also be carefully monitored in this respect. Because in times of great geopolitical pressure, the most fragile point of states is not their external front, but their internal integrity. There is not even a comment on the contribution of the main opposition, let alone the extremely vital and serious foreign / security policy issues experienced today.
Therefore, no anti-thesis can be produced against the view of the government in Türkiye on NATO and EU issues. This situation presents an opportunity that the collapsing western hegemony will not seek. However, internal integrity is just as important as external pressures. History shows that the most fragile point of states in great geopolitical struggles is often the internal front. The Mosul issue is a striking example of this. In 1925, while Türkiye was focused on the Mosul case, the outbreak of the Sheikh Said Rebellion turned Ankara’s attention to domestic security problems, and as a result, Britain got what it wanted about Mosul. When the internal front weakens, the chance of success in the external struggle decreases.
For this reason, the main task before Türkiye is to protect the Montreux regime without being caught up in the provocations in the Aegean and Black Seas, not to become a party to the war in the Black Sea, and to maintain its national interest-centered balance policy. For Türkiye, the issue is not the Ukraine war, but the Black Sea balance. Montreux is not just a convention it is the foundation of Türkiye’s strategic autonomy. Türkiye’s active neutrality regime in the Second World War thanks to the Montreux regime is criticized by NATO’s sworn hawkish anti-Russian front, especially Britain. Unfortunately, there is tug of war between the national and NATO fronts within us. This contradiction will increase as the NATO summit approaches. Türkiye has vital and common interests with Russia such as trade, tourism, energy, Syria, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Therefore, Ankara’s main priority is not to be the front line of the NATO-Russia showdown, but to maintain its balancing position. The transformation of the Black Sea into a NATO lake will create a serious strategic risk not only for Russia but also for Türkiye.
The main challenge that Türkiye will face in the coming weeks is not to fall prey to Greece and NATO’s provocations and false flag plots in the Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Seas. Turkiye should not become a party to the escalating tension in the Black Sea and should strive to protect the Montreux regime. The greatest threat is not a planned war, but miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation. What Türkiye needs is not to open new fronts, but to protect the mind of the state. A strategic approach centered on composure, geopolitical balance and national interest will continue to be Türkiye’s strongest security shield in the face of impending global turbulence.
* Feel free to repost Global Research articles with proper attribution.
This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.
Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM.
He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
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